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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
TIMOTHY KEVIN DUNCAN, 
De fendant/Appe11ant. 
Case No. 900217-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-35-26(2)(a) (Supp. 1989) and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989), whereby a defendant in a district 
court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals 
from a final judgment and conviction for any crime other than a 
first degree or capital felony. 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The pertinent parts of the following statutes and 
constitutional provisions are provided in Addendum A: 
22 Okla. Stat. § 991c (Supp. 1973) 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-4(2)(b)(i)(D) 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(b)(i) 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(7) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-204 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-206 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1)(a)(i) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1)(b)(i) 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-4 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-9 
U.S. Const, amend VI 
Utah Const, art. I, § 12 
Fed. R. Evid. 609 
Utah R. Evid. 609 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the court err in excluding the prior felony 
conviction of the State's witness? 
a. When a defendant pleads guilty to a crime, is it a 
"conviction" for impeachment purposes? 
b. Is a prior felony conviction of a nondefendant 
witness automatically admissible for impeachment purposes under 
Rule 609(a)(1)? 
c. Did the jury incorrectly assume that the owner of 
stolen items was the more credible and knowledgable witness? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for 
Receiving Stolen Property, a second degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-408, -412(1)(a)(i) (1989), and Theft by 
Deception, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-405 (1989). 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On July 8, 1989, Michael Skillings discovered that two 
items were missing from his car repair shop, "Mike's Auto Body." 
(T 115, 117-118). The first item, a battery charger, was two years 
old at the time of the theft. (T 106) . The bottom of the charger 
was falling apart, (T 134), and its overall condition was extremely 
dirty. (T 110-11). In order to clean the charger, it would have to 
be scrubbed for at least one hour. (T 110-11). The charger 
contained no known mechanical defects. (T 111). Michael Skillings 
testified that a new battery charger cost approximately $480 and a 
used charger cost $275. (T 106, 108). 
The second item, a plasma cutter, cuts sheet metal off of 
cars. (T 104). When the cutter was stolen, it was "a little over a 
year" old. (T 105, 111). According to Michael Skillings, the cutter 
was not used every day and had only been used "25, 30 times." 
(T 111). In contrast to Skillings statements, however, another 
co-worker testified that the shop used the equipment "just about 
every day." (T 141). Skillings' co-worker, Raul Beauchamp, also 
testified that he, alone, used "them three or four times a week." 
(T 141). The cutter was also dirty, requiring at least "a couple of 
hours" of scrubbing and cleaning. (T 112, 142). Skillings testified 
that a new cutter could be purchased for $1,399. (T 106). Skillings 
then testified, over Appellant's objections, that the fair market 
value price of the cutter was $1,100 to $1,200, (T 107-08). 
Appellant Timothy Kevin Duncan did not steal the items, 
(T 246), although he was present when Leo Dickey, a friend of 
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Duncan's, brought them into the pawn shop. Duncan pawned the items 
at the pawn shop. (T 252). 
A pawnbroker, Mark Brown, testified that he would pay "in 
the ballpark of about . . . $400, $500, maybe" for the plasma cutter 
and the battery charger. (T 188). Since pawnbrokers buy an item on 
a "percentage of what [they] can sell the item for" and "generally 
have a hundred percent markup," (T 172), the fair market value of 
both items would therefore be "$800, $1000, maybe." 
The State charged Timothy Duncan with Receiving Stolen 
Property, a second degree felony; Receiving Stolen Property, a third 
degree felony; and Theft by Deception, a class B misdemeanor. 
(R 48-50). During the pretrial motions, Timothy Duncan moved to 
impeach the credibility of Michael Skillings, a convicted felon, 
with evidence of Skillings' guilty plea to "Attempted Unlawful 
Distribution for Value of a Controlled Substance," a third degree 
felony. (T 75-81). The court denied Timothy Duncan's motion. (T 81). 
4 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The court erred in excluding evidence of a prior felony 
conviction of the State's witness, Michael Skillings. The court 
failed to recognize that when Skillings had pleaded guilty to a 
third degree felony charge, his confession of guilt constituted a 
"conviction" for impeachment purposes. A subsequent reduction of 
his crime would not nullify the fact that Skillings had already 
entered a plea of guilty to the felony charge. 
The felony conviction of Michael Skillings, a nondefendant 
witness, is automatically admissible for impeachment purposes under 
Utah R. Evid 609(a)(1). The balancing test of Rule 609 applies only 
to a criminal defendant and would not have affected the inclusion of 
Michael Skillings conviction. 
By excluding evidence of Skillings' prior felony 
conviction, the court deprived Timothy Duncan of an effective means 
of impeaching Skillings credibility. In addition, Duncan could not 
fully confront Michael Skillings. Skillings, the owner of the 
stolen items, was a key witness for the State on issues concerning 
the fair market value of the items and their depreciation value. 
The jury may not have believed Skillings' testimony had it known 
that he was a convicted felon. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT 
THE COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING THE PRIOR FELONY 
CONVICTION OF THE STATED WITNESS, 
Courts have consistently recognized the value of impeaching 
a witness7 credibility through the introduction of prior felony 
convictions. 
One way of discrediting the witness is to introduce 
evidence of a prior criminal conviction of that 
witness. By so doing, the cross-examiner intends to 
afford the jury a basis to infer that the witness7 
character is such that he would be less likely than 
the average trustworthy citizen to be truthful in 
his testimony. 
Davis v. Alaska. 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974). More than a century ago, 
during his early tenure as a justice on the Massachusetts Judicial 
Court, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. espoused the same sentiments: 
[W]hen it is proved that a witness has been 
convicted of a crime, the [basis] for disbelieving 
him . . . is the general readiness to do evil which 
the conviction may be supposed to show. It is from 
that general disposition alone that the jury is 
asked to infer a readiness to lie in the particular 
case, and thence that he has lied in fact. The 
evidence has no tendency to prove that he was 
mistaken, but only that he has perjured himself, and 
it reaches that conclusion solely through the 
general proposition that he is of bad character and 
unworthy of credit. 
Gertz v. Fitchburg Railroad Co., 137 Mass. 77, 78 (1884) 
(Holmes, Jr., J.)# reprinted in Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 
490 U.S. , 104 L.Ed.2d 557, 563-564 n.4, 109 S.Ct. 1981 (1989). 
In the case at bar, the trial court improperly excluded the 
prior conviction of Michael Skillings, a felony which the jury 
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should have been able to consider in assessing the trustworthiness 
of his testimony. The jury should not have believed Michael 
Skillings' testimony. 
A. THE ENTRY OF A GUILTY PLEA IS A CONVICTION 
WHICH MAY BE USED FOR IMPEACHMENT PURPOSES. 
During the pretrial conference, Timothy Duncan sought to 
impeach the credibility of the State's key witness, Michael 
Skillings, through the introduction of his prior guilty plea to the 
crime of "Attempted Unlawful Distribution for Value of a Controlled 
Substance (Cocaine)," a third degree felony. (T 75-81); Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 58-37-4(2) (b) (i) (D)f -8(1) (a) (ii) , -8(l)(b)(i), -8(7) 
(1989). Originally charged with "Unlawful Distribution for Value of 
a Controlled Substance (Cocaine)," a second degree felony, Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 58-37-4(2)(b) (i)(D) , -8(1)(a)(ii), -8(l)(b)(i) (1989), 
Skillings subsequently pled guilty to the third degree felony charge 
before the Honorable James Sawaya. (T 76-77). At the time of his 
sentencing, however, Skillings moved for a judgment and sentence 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402. (T 77). Section 402 states 
in pertinent part: 
(1) If the court, having regard to the nature 
and circumstances of the offense of which the 
defendant was found guilty and to the history and 
character of the defendant, concludes that it would 
be unduly harsh to record the conviction as being 
for that category of offense established by statute 
and to sentence the defendant to an alternative 
normally applicable to that offense, the court may, 
unless otherwise specifically provided by law, enter 
a judgment of conviction for the next lower category 
of offense and impose sentence accordingly. 
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(2) Whenever a conviction is for a felony, the 
conviction shall be deemed to be a misdemeanor if: 
(a) The judge designates the sentence to 
be for a misdemeanor and the sentence imposed 
is within the limits provided by law for a 
misdemeanor . . • . 
U.C.A. § 76-3-402. Judge Sawaya granted defendant Skillings' motion 
and designated his crime, "Attempted Unlawful Distribution for Value 
of a Controlled Substance," a class A misdemeanor. (T 77, 81). 
Skillings was then sentenced to twelve months in jail with eighteen 
months probation. (T 77). 
The trial court in the case at bar, the Honorable Kenneth 
Rigtrup presiding, reviewed Judge Sawaya's ruling and held as 
follows: 
The Court concludes that the order of 
May 2nd, 1986, signed by Judge Sawaya is the actual 
conviction. And that on its face indicates that the 
crime is Attempted Unlawful Distribution for Value 
of a Controlled Substance, a Class A Misdemeanor. 
Accordingly, under 609(a), the Court 
concludes that it is not a conviction involving 
imprisonment for over one year. So, for that 
reason, I will not allow you to use that for 
impeachment purposes. 
(T 81). As explained below, Judge Rigtrup's reasoning and holding 
were erroneous. Skillings' guilty plea should have been admissible 
for impeachment purposes. 
In State v. Delashmutt. 676 P.2d 383 (Utah 1983), the "sole 
question posed . . . was whether for impeachment purposes a plea of 
guilty to a felony is a conviction." 676 P.2d at 384. Defendant 
Delashmutt had moved the trial court to suppress his "prior guilty 
plea to a felony in Washington State. The Washington plea had been 
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entered, but sentence had not been imposed." X£. Delashmutt 
argued1 that a conviction consisted of the entry of a guilty plea 
and the imposition of a sentence. Id. The trial court denied 
Delashmutt's motion. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed. 676 P.2d at 384. 
Holding "that a guilty plea is a conviction just as is the verdict 
of a jury," the Court found the sentencing phase of his crime 
irrelevant to the trial court's determination of whether the 
underlying crime should be used for impeachment purposes. Id. 
Citing numerous code provisions evidencing the intent to sentence 
criminals only after they had been convicted, the Court read Utah's 
criminal code as "reflecting] a legislative intent that a guilty 
plea or a verdict is a conviction before sentence is imposed." Id. 
at 384 (emphasis added); see also U.C.A. §§ 76-3-203, -204, -206, 
1
 Defendant Delashmutt cited Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-9 
(1983) for his argument. The applicable provision read: 
A witness must answer questions legal and pertinent 
to the matter in issue, although his answer may 
establish a claim against himself; but he need not 
give an answer which will have a tendency which will 
subject him to punishment for a felony; nor need he 
give an answer which will have a direct tendency to 
degrade his character, unless it is the very fact in 
issue or the fact from which the fact in issue would 
be presumed. But a witness must answer as to the 
fact of his previous conviction of felony. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-9 (emphasis added). In State v. Banner, 717 
P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court held that "to the 
extent the last sentence in § 78-24-9 is inconsistent with Utah R. 
Evid. 609, it is superseded." 717 P.2d at 1333. There is no 
inconsistency here, however, as the holding pertaining to both 
authorities is that the entry of a guilty plea is a "conviction" for 
impeachment purposes. 
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-207; 77-1-4. Evidence of a guilty plea was thus a conviction, 
admissible for impeachment purposes notwithstanding the fact that a 
sentence had not been imposed. 676 P.2d at 384. 
Not only does Delashmutt refute the State's belief that 
"there is [no] conviction until . . . a sentence [is] imposed," 
(T 80), the opinion also illustrates that the trial court focused on 
the wrong phase of Skillings' prior criminal proceeding.2 Michael 
Skillings pled guilty to the crime of "Attempted Unlawful 
Distribution for Value of a Controlled Substance," a third degree 
felony, at the time of his arraignment. (T 77). Under Delashmutt, 
Skillings' confession of guilt constituted the "conviction." Judge 
Sawaya's ruling, ordered at the time of Skillings sentencing, did 
not negate the existence of Skillings' guilty plea. Consequently, 
Judge Rigtrup erred in failing to recognize that the entry of a 
guilty plea, standing alone, was a conviction which should have been 
used to impeach the credibility of Michael Skillings. 
Another case lending considerable guidance is United 
States v. Turner, 497 F.2d 406 (10th Cir. 1974). There, the 
government impeached Larry Turner's credibility by asking him "if he 
had pleaded guilty in state court to previous felony charges." 
2
 Utah courts have repeatedly emphasized the 
discretionary power given to the trial courts in sentencing 
defendants pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402; cf. State v. 
Durant, 674 P.2d 638, 642 n.2 (Utah 1983) ("This statute [U.C.A. 
§ 76-3-402(1)] allows the trial court to impose a sentence 
appropriate for the next lower category of offense if the 
circumstances as a whole warrant"); State v. Harding, 576 P.2d 
1284 n.3 (Utah 1978); State v. Jones, 657 P.2d 1263, 1267-68 n.7 
(Utah 1982). 
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Id, at 407. Turner objected "[b]ecause his guilty plea resulted in 
a deferred sentence and not a judgment of guilt. . . . " Id. 
Previously, Turner had entered a guilty plea pursuant to an Oklahoma 
statute which allowed a court to defer further proceedings and place 
him on probation for two years. Id. (citing 22 O.S. § 991c (Supp. 
1973)). Having entered his plea and successfully completed his 
probation, the statute provided that Turner "shall be discharged 
without a court judgment of guilt, . . . [the] plea of guilty shall 
be expunged from the record and said charge shall be dismissed with 
prejudice to any further action. 497 F.2d at 407. Turner contended 
that he had not been convicted and that evidence of his guilty plea 
was improperly admitted into evidence. Id. 
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit rejected Turner's argument. 
While acknowledging that "a deferred sentence is not a 
'conviction,'" the Court nevertheless held "that a guilty plea is a 
confession of guilt and amounts to a conviction." Id. Accordingly, 
"Turner's guilty plea [did] amount to a conviction, and was 
admissible for impeachment purposes." Jd. at 408. 
The holding of Turner is even more compelling for the 
facts in the present case. While the Oklahoma statute allowed the 
complete dismissal of Turner's charge, the Utah statute reduced 
Skillings' crime only "to the next lower category of offense." 
Compare Turner, 497 F.2d 406 (10th Cir. 1974) (citing 22 O.S. § 991c 
(Supp. 1973)) with Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402. Just as the Tenth 
Circuit upheld the admissibility of a guilty plea to a crime which 
was ultimately dismissed with prejudice, Appellant Timothy Duncan 
- 11 -
requests this Court to admit Skillings' guilty plea to a crime which 
was ultimately reduced to a misdemeanor. In both cases, the entry 
of the guilty plea is the focus of the inquiry for impeachment 
purposes. The nature of subsequent proceedings, even those in which 
the judgment is reduced or completely dismissed, has no bearing on 
the trial court's determination of whether a prior conviction may be 
used for impeachment purposes. See United States v. Klein, 560 F.2d 
1236 (5th Cir. 1977) (defendant could be impeached by evidence of 
prior guilty verdict even though the judgment and sentence had not 
been entered); Johnson v. State, 449 So.2d 921 (Fla. App. 1 Dist. 
1984) (reversal required when the trial court refused to give an 
instruction "to the effect that the jury should consider, in 
weighing the credibility of a witness, whether the witness has been 
convicted of a crime" since the witness had previously entered a 
guilty plea to a crime but had not yet been sentenced). 
B. THE BALANCING TEST OF RULE 609(a)(1) DOES NOT 
APPLY TO THE STATE'S WITNESS. 
Evidence of Michael Skillings' felony conviction "shall be 
admitted" for impeachment purposes. Utah R. Evid. 609(a)(1). 
Utah R. Evid. 609(a)(1) states: 
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a 
witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a 
crime shall be admitted if elicited from him or 
established by public record during 
cross-examination but only if the crime (1) was 
punishable3 by death or imprisonment in excess of 
3
 The plain language of Rule 609(a)(1) also supports the 
inclusion of Michael Skillings prior felony conviction. -[cont'd]-
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one year under the law under which he was convicted, 
and the court determines that the probative value of 
admitting the evidence outweighs its prejudicial 
effect to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty 
or false statement, regardless of the punishment. 
Id. (emphasis added). Subsection 1 of Rule 609(a) contains two 
clauses. The first clause allowed Timothy Duncan to introduce 
evidence of Skillings' prior conviction, a felony punishable by 
imprisonment in excess of one year, for the purpose of attacking his 
credibility. Id. The second clause would ordinarily require the 
court to conduct a balancing test when the defendant or a person 
testifying on the defendant's behalf is the witness. The balancing 
test was therefore inapposite here because Michael Skillings was a 
witness for the State. Evidence of Michael Skillings prior felony 
conviction was automatically admissible for impeachment purposes. 
No balancing test applied to his testimony. Green v. Bock Laundry 
Machine Co.. 490 U.S. , 104 L.Ed.2d 557, 109 S.Ct. 1981 (1989). 
A brief review of Green clarifies the principle "that the rule 
3 [cont'd] The ruie applies if the crime "was punishable 
[as a felony] under the law under which he was convicted . . . ." 
Id. (emphasis added). "Punishment means the punishment that might 
have been imposed, not that which was actually imposed." M. Graham, 
Handbook of the Federal Rules of Evidence § 609.2, at 473 (1988); 
cf. State v. Crawford. 60 Utah 6, 206 P. 717, 720 (1922) (evidence 
of a witness' prior felony conviction may be admissible for 
impeachment purposes, even though an appeal of his conviction was 
still pending at the time of his trial and the appellate court 
ultimately decided that the conviction was improper); Utah R. Evid 
609(e). Michael Skillings' crime, "Attempted Unlawful Distribution 
for Value of a Controlled Substance," was punishable as a third 
degree felony. Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-4(2)(b)(i)(D), -8(1)(a)(ii), 
-8(l)(b)(i), -8(7) (1989). His reduced sentence did not eliminate 
his prior guilty plea to the felony charge. Skillings' felony 
conviction was improperly excluded from the jury's consideration. 
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[609(a)(1)]4 was meant to authorize the judge to weigh prejudice 
against no one other than a criminal defendant." 104 L.Ed.2d at 572. 
In petitioner Paul Green's product liability action against 
respondent Bock Laundry Machine Co., the manufacturer of the machine 
that injured Green, Bock impeached Green's testimony by eliciting 
admissions that he had previously been convicted of burglary and a 
related felony. 104 L.Ed.2d at 562. After the jury returned a 
verdict for Bock, Green argued on appeal that the district court had 
erred by denying his pretrial motion to exclude the impeaching 
evidence. Id. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals and the United 
States Supreme Court affirmed the district court ruling. 
After an examination of the plain language of the rule and 
its legislative history, the United States Supreme Court concluded 
that "only the accused in a criminal case should be protected from 
unfair prejudice by the balance set out in Rule 609(a)(1)." 104 
L.Ed.2d at 573. "The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees 
a criminal defendant certain fair trial rights not enjoyed by the 
prosecution . . . ." Id. at 565. "[I]mpeaching evidence 
detrimental to the prosecution in a criminal case 'shall be 
admitted' without any such balancing." Id. at 564. 
As revealed by the rule's legislative history, "[i]t was 
the judgment of the Conference that the danger of prejudice to a 
4
 In State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986), the Utah 
Supreme Court acknowledged that it recognized interpretations of the 
federal rules when it interpreted the Utah rules, particularily Utah 
R. Evid 609, a verbatim replica of Fed. R. Evid. 609. 
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nondefendant witness is outweighed by the need for the trier of fact 
to have as much relevant evidence on the issue of credibility as 
possible." Id. at 571 (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1597, pp. 
9-10 (1974)). "Equally clear is the conferee's intention that the 
rule shield the accused, but not the prosecution, in a criminal 
case." 104 L.Ed.2d at 571. "As one Conference Committee Member 
explained: 'Now a defendant can cross-examine a government witness 
about any of his previous felony convictions; he can always do it, 
because that will not prejudice him in any way . . . Only the 
government is going to be limited . . . .'" 120 Cong. Rec. 40894 
(1974) (remarks of Rep. Dennis) reprinted in Green, 104 L.Ed.2d 557, 
571. "Any prejudice [that] convictions [used for] impeachment 
[purposes] might cause witnesses other than the accused was deemed 
'so minimal as scarcely to be a subject of comment.'" 104 L.Ed.2d 
at 572 (citations omitted). 
The Court consequently held that nondefendant witnesses or 
civil witnesses like petitioner Green shall have their prior felony 
convictions admitted without invoking the balancing test. 104 
L.Ed.2d at 573. Accordingly, evidence of Michael Skillings' prior 
felony conviction should have been admissible for impeachment 
purposes. See also United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 359 (D.C. 
Cir. 1976) ("The addition of the phrase 'to the defendant' at the 
end of Rule 609(a)(1) reflects a deliberate choice to regulate 
impeachment by prior conviction only where the defendant's interests 
might be damaged by admission of evidence of past crimes, and not 
where the prosecution might suffer . . . " ) . 
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C. THE JURY INCORRECTLY ASSUMED THAT MICHAEL 
SHILLINGS WAS THE MORE CREDIBLE WITNESS. 
In the State's closing argument, it noted the importance of 
the witness' testimony and acknowledged that Michael Skillings' 
credibility had not been impeached: 
The witnesses aren't on trial, unless it's 
important to decide if they are lying. And if 
they are lying about this whole thing, then we 
[the State] haven't proven our case. I suspect 
that you have to make that consideration . . . 
And, again, it goes down to credibility . . . I 
guess, you [the jury] believe him [Michael 
Skillings], or you don't believe him. Quite 
frankly, I haven't seen anything to impeach his 
credibility, period. 
(T 295-96) (emphasis added). Timothy Duncan concurs with the State, 
emphasizing as well that the jury's verdict hinged upon how it 
viewed the credibility of the testifying witnesses. Absent evidence 
of Skillings prior felony conviction,5 the jury had no reason to 
disbelieve his testimony.6 
5
 Timothy Duncan's right of confrontation also permitted 
the introduction of Michael Skillings prior felony conviction. 
U.S. Const, amend VI; Utah Const, art. I, §12; State v. Conrov, 642 
P.2d 873 (Ariz. App. 1982). For example in Conroy, the Arizona 
court relied on the confrontation clause as the basis for its 
holding that it was reversible error to not allow the defendant to 
use the prior felony conviction of a government witness to impeach 
that witness. Because the Arizona version of Rule 609 did not 
include the phrase "to the defendant," the Court relied on the 
confrontation clause rather that the rule itself. 642 P.2d at 876. 
6
 Michael Skillings testimony was equally important for 
the State in proving that Timothy Duncan committed all the crimes 
alleged. (T 102-38; 220-22). If the jury did not find Skillings to 
be a credible witness, it may have not believed Skillings testimony 
which alleged that Duncan knew the items were stolen. If Duncan did 
not know the items were stolen, he could not have been convicted of 
either category of Receiving Stolen Property, nor could he have 
committed Theft by Deception. 
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"Because an owner is presumed to be familiar with the value 
of his possessions, an owner is competent to testify on the present 
market value of his property." State v. Purcell, 711 P.2d 243, 245 
(Utah 1985). Michael Skillings, the owner of "Mike's Auto Body," 
testified that on July 8, 1989, the fair market value of his plasma 
cutter was $1100 to $1200 and his battery charger was $275.7 
(T 108). By excluding evidence of Skillings' prior felony 
conviction, Skillings appeared more knowledgable to the jury on 
issues concerning the plasma cutter and battery charger than Raul 
Beauchamp, a co-worker who testified about the condition of the 
stolen items, and Mark Brown, a pawnbroker who testified about the 
fair market value of the items. 
Raul Beauchamp testified that the plasma cutter and battery 
charger were used by Mike's Auto Body "just about every day." 
(T 141). Raul, himself, "use[d] them three or four times a week," 
(T 141). In contrast, Michael Skillings testified that the plasma 
cutter "is not an every day tool . . . [and had been used only] 25, 
30 times." (T 111). 
Mark Brown testified that he would pay "in the ballpark of 
about . . . $400, $500, maybe" for the plasma cutter and the battery 
charger. (T 188). Carson Jenkins, the pawnbroker who actually 
pawned the items, paid Duncan $90 for both items. (T 170). Since 
7
 Skillings represented that he called Snap-On to 
determine the price of a used plasma cutter and a used battery 
charger. (T 106-09). But the fair market price of used equipment, 
in general, may differ from the fair market price of his used 
equipment because of the deterioration or depreciation particular to 
his equipment. 
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pawnbrokers buy an item on a "percentage of what [they] can sell the 
item for" and "generally have a hundred percent markup," (T 172), 
the fair market value of both items would therefore be $180 or, at 
most, "$800, $1000, maybe." Indeed, Brown's use of the term "maybe" 
indicated that his ballpark figure was an optimistic price. He 
would of course accept any price that the market would bear but 
there was no proof, other than the exaggerated testimony of Michael 
Skillings, that the cutter and charger would actually bear a fair 
market price exceeding $1000. 
If the court had informed the jury of Skillings' prior 
conviction, it could have determined that Skillings' testimony was 
not credible. Unable to consider the impeaching evidence, the jury 
ignored the discrepancies by simply presuming that Skillings' 
ownership interest in the stolen items made him the more credible 
witness. 
Receiving Stolen Property, a second degree felony, requires 
the property to have a fair market "value of more than $1000.00" 
(R 48); Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-408, -412(1)(a)(i) (1989). Receiving 
Stolen Property, a third degree felony, requires the property to 
have a fair market "value of more than $250.00 but not more than 
$1000.00" (R 49); Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-408, -412(1)(b)(i) (1989). 
Michael Skillings was the only witness who unequivocally testified 
that the fair market value of the plasma cutter and battery charger 
exceeded $1000. The jury believed Skillings, finding Timothy Duncan 
guilty of the second degree felony charge. Had the court not erred 
in excluding evidence of Skillings' prior felony conviction, the 
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jury may have found Timothy Duncan guilty of the lesser included 
offense: Receiving Stolen Property, a third degree felony. 
D. THE APARTMENT MANAGER IN STATE V. PURCELL WAS 
A MORE CREDIBLE WITNESS THAN MICHAEL SHILLINGS 
State v. Purcell, 711 P.2d 243 (Utah 1985), a case holding 
that "an owner is competent to testify on the present market value 
of his property," is distinguishable from the case at bar. In 
Purcell, the owner of stolen furniture testified that "two years 
earlier the furniture had been purchased new for approximately 
$2,900 to $3,300, that it was in very good condition, and that at 
the time of the theft it was probably worth between $1000 and 
$1,500." Id. at 245. The apartment manager thus conceded a 
depreciation factor between 50% to 70%. The manager, presumably 
familiar with the value of his possessions, properly testified about 
the fair market value of his property. The manager was not only 
competent to testify, there was also no evidence indicating that he 
was not credible. 
In contrast, Michael Skillings' testimony negated any 
presumption regarding his familiarity with the value of his 
possessions. Skillings did not know the cost of a new plasma cutter 
until the day before Timothy Duncan's trial when he called the 
Snap-On dealership. (T 131). Skillings also did not know the cost 
of a used plasma cutter or a batter charger. Skillings,8 instead, 
8
 The State presented no evidence substantiating the 
testimony of Michael Skillings, a lay witness who lacked knowledge 
concerning the depreciation value of the plasma cutter and the 
battery charger. 
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acknowledged calling Snap-On when he sought prices for each item. 
(T 106-09). Furthermore, Skillings certainly did not buy and sell 
plasma cutters and battery chargers with the same regularity as an 
apartment manager who bought and sold used furniture. Hence, 
Skillings possessed neither the competence nor the familiarity 
concerning the value of his property as the apartment manager in 
Purcell. 
More importantly, even if Skillings was a competent 
witness, he was not credible. Michael Skillings admitted to only a 
14% to 21% mark down in his valuation of the stolen property. He 
testified that a new plasma cutter cost $1399 and that the stolen 
cutter cost between $1100 and $1200. (T 106-08). Skillings 
estimated that a new battery charger cost $480 and the stolen 
charger cost $275. (T 106, 108). Had Skillings, like the apartment 
manager in Purcell, candidly disclosed a 70% to 50% depreciation 
factor for the stolen items,9 the fair market value of the plasma 
cutter and the battery charger would have been between $755 and 
$940. The actual fair market value of the stolen items did not 
exceed $1000. 
Skillings valuation was also disputed by Mark Brown, a 
disinterested witness who did not price the stolen items over $1000. 
By comparison, the apartment manager's testimony in Purcell was not 
contradicted. State v. Purcell, 711 P.2d 243, 245 (Utah 1985). 
9
 A 70% to 50% mark down of a new plasma cutter valued at 
$1399 would be between $419.70 and $699.50. A 70% to 50% mark down 
of a new battery charger valued at $480 would be between $144 and 
$240. 
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Interestingly, Skillings made - "slip" before the _ 
that ln;i would nul iirivf ni<i(l<' (lurirKf hi elephone inquiries for the 
used items. Skillings told the jury that the equipment "works 
well . ' It is just, you know, dirt/," (T 110-11). Skillitiqt later 
e • Tji», / i« testimony when he lifted the 
bottom of the battery charger and indicated that it was "falling 
apart " (T ] 34) If the Snap-On dealersh v th.it t.h«' equipment 
1 lad detei: ior ated beyond the "d i rty" condition described by 
Skillings, Skillings would have received i quote much lower than the 
price he alleged during his test im* M M 
I.I I Extinguishing Purcell and the instant action pertains ,:.'> the 
condition of the stolen furniture. The stolen furniture in Purcell 
was no t d e s c r i b e d a s " d i r t y " .uini i unt^il i< 11 h p u n t MWIHI, no r was i t 
"falling apart" as the equipment owned by Michael Skillings. 
In addition, Skillings' testimony lacked the foundation set 
forth in Purcell. Wh*»n Ski J I inu » I *jst M.M'H dbnut the fair market 
value of a used cutter, the following dialogue transpired: 
[THE STATE]: Ha we you had occasion to check 
with the Snap-On dealership about replacement of 
used items? 
[MICHAEL SKILLINGS]i Yes. 
[THE STATE]: And what is the fair-market 
value—what would you be able to purchase a plasma 
cutter, that's within the same condition as the o«^ 
that was taken from you, for? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, hearsay not 
within the exception, Your Honor. 
THE COURT I.ay a better foundation. 
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[THE STATE]: Let me ask you this. Do you 
have an opinion as to what the value of the plasma 
cutter was at the time of July 8th, 1989, when it 
was taken from you? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, foundation, 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Overruled. You may answer that 
yes or no. 
[MICHAEL SHILLINGS]: (No audible response.) 
THE COURT: Do you have an opinion? 
[MICHAEL SHILLINGS]: How much is it worth? 
THE COURT: How much was it worth on the date 
of July 8, 1989? 
[MICHAEL SHILLINGS]: I would say, you know, 
$1,200, $1,150. 
(T 106-07). Skillings could not testify about the fair market value 
of the plasma cutter without violating the hearsay rule. 
Acknowledging this fact, the court requested a better foundation. 
The State did not comply with the court's request. Rather, the 
court—and not the State—elicited testimony from Michael Skillings 
on the most disputed fact of Timothy Duncan's trial. The court's 
conduct was improper and further distinguished the holding of 
Purcell. See Purcell, 711 P.2d at 244. 
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CONCLUSION 
App* was improperly convicted of the 
crimes charged against him. He was entitled f o impeach the 
testimony o* Michael Skillings with evidence •.-I ^ior 
on. H.i'l 1. he jury received such impeaching evidence, 
v
 nd7 * nave believed that Mr. Duncan unlawfully received the 
stolen items and pawned thorn fun LPM lnuley. [' j mot hy Duncan 
respectfully requests this Court to reverse his conviction and 
remand this case for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED th J s j^ . .' day nl AutjUM, 19 "J u. 
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ADDENDUM A 
TEXT OF STATUTES & CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
22 Oklu. Stat. § 991c (Supp. 1973) provides: 
Upon a verdict or plea of guilty, but before a judgment of 
guilt, the court may, without entering a judgment of guilt and with 
the consent of the defendant, defer further proceedings and place the 
defendant on probation under the supervision of the State Department 
of Corrections upon the conditions of probation prescribed by the 
court. Such conditions may include restitution when applicable. 
Upon completion of the probation term, which probation term under 
this procedure shall not exceed two (2) years, the defendant shall be 
discharged without a court judgment of guilt, and ther verdict or 
plea of guilty shall be expunged from the record and said charge 
shall be dismissed with prejudice to any further action. Upon 
violation of the conditions of probation, the court may enter a 
judgment of guilt and proceed as provided in Section I of this act. 
The deferred judgment procedure described in this section shall only 
aPPly t o defendants not having been previously convicted of a felony. 
58-37-4. Schedules of controlled substances — Schedules I 
through V — Findings required — Specific sub-
stances included in schedules. 
(1) There are established five schedules of controlled substances to be 
known as schedules I, II, HI, IV, and V which shall consist of substances listed 
in this section. 
(2) Schedules I, II, EI, IV, and V shall consist of the following drugs or other 
substances, by whatever official name, common or usual name, chemical 
name or brand name designated: 
(b) Schedule E 
(D) Coca leaves and any salt, compound, derivative, or prepa-
ration of coca leaves, and any salt, compound, derivative, or prep-
aration thereof which is chemically equivalent or identical with 
any of these substances, and shall include cocaine, its isomers 
and salts of isomers, whether derived from the coca plant or 
synthetically produced, except that the substances shall not in-
clude decocainized coca leaves or extraction of coca leaves, which 
extractions do not contain cocaine or ecgonine. 
58-37-8. Prohibited acts — Penalties [Effective until July 
1, 1990]. J 
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person 
to knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to 
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit sub-
stance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree 
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit 
substance; 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II is guilty of a second 
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction of Subsec-
tion (l)(a) is guilty of a first degree felony; 
(7) Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense unlawful 
under this chapter is upon conviction guilty of one degree less than the maxi-
mum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
76-3-203. Felony conviction — Indeterminate term oi im-
prisonment — Increase of sentence if firearm 
used. 
A person who has been convicted of a felony niriv be sentenced l.o imprison-
ment for an indeterminate term as follows: 
(1) In the case of a felony of the first degree, for a term at not less than 
five years, unless otherwise specifically provided by law, and which may 
be for life but if the trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile or the 
representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of 
the felony, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a 
term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court 
may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate 
term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently; 
76-3-204. Misdemeanor conviction — Term of imprison-
ment. 
person who has been convicted of a misdemeanor may b^ sentem'tnl r<> 
imprisonment as follows: 
(1) In the case of a class A misdemeanor, for a term not exceeding one 
year; 
(2) In the case of a class B misdemeanor, for a term not exceeding six 
months; 
(3) In the case of a « 1M:-.., (' niLideiw-anor, tor J term not exceeding 
ninety days. 
76-3-206. Capital felony Death or life imprisonment. 
(1) A person who has been convicted of a capital felony shall be sentenced 
in accordance with Section 76-3-207, and sentence shall be death or life im-
prisonment as the court or jury, in accordance with this section, shall deter-
mine. 
(2) The judgment of conviction and sentence of death shall be subject to 
automatic review by the Utah State Supreme Court within 60 days after 
certification by the sentencing court of the entire record unless time is ex-
tended an additional period not to exceed 30 days by the Utah State Supreme 
Court for good cause shown. Such review by the Utah State Supreme Court 
shall have priority over all other cases and shall be heard in accordance with 
rules promulgated by the Utah State Supreme Court. 
VtwJ-UO/ Capital felony — Sentencing proceeding. 
(1) When a defendant has pled guilty to or been found guilty of a capital 
felony, there shall be further proceedings before the court or jury on the issue 
of sentence. In the case of a plea of guilty to a capital felony, the sentencing 
proceedings shall be conducted by the court which accepted the plea or by a 
jury upon request of the defendant. When a defendant has been found guilty of 
a capital felony, the proceedings shall be conducted before the court or jury 
which found the defendant guilty, provided the defendant may waive hearing 
before the jury, in which event the hearing shall be before the court. If, how-
ever, circumstances make it impossible or impractical to reconvene the same 
jury for the sentencing proceedings the court may dismiss that jury and con-
vene a new jury for such proceedings. If a retrial of the sentencing proceedings 
is necessary as a consequence of a remand from an appellate court, the sen-
tencing authority shall be determined as provided in Subsection (4) below 
76-3-402. Conviction of lower category of offense. 
(1) If the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the of-
fense of which the defendant was found guilty and to the history and charac-
ter of the defendant, concludes that it would be unduly harsh to record the 
conviction as being for that category of offense established by statute and to 
sentence the defendant to an alternative normally applicable to that offense, 
the court may, unless otherwise specifically provided by law, enter a judgment 
of conviction for the next lower category of offense and impose sentence ac-
cordingly. 
(2) Whenever a conviction is for a felony, the conviction shall be deemed to 
be a' misdemeanor if: 
\ (a) The judge designates the sentence to be for a misdemeanor and the 
sentence imposed is within the limits provided by law for a misdemeanor; 
76-6-405. Theft by deception. 
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises control over property of 
another by deception and with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
(2) Theft by deception does not occur, however, when there is only falsity as 
to matters having no pecuniary significance, or puffing by statements 
unlikely to deceive ordinary persons in the group addressed. "Puffing" means 
an exaggerated commendation of wares or worth in communications ad-
dressed to the public or to a class or group. 
76-6-408. Receiving stolen property — Duties of pawnbro-
kers. 
(1) A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of the property 
of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it probably has 
been stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling, or 
withholding any such property from the owner, knowing the property to be 
stolen, with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof. 
(2) The knowledge or belief required for paragraph (1) is presumed in the 
case of an actor who: 
(a) Is found in possession or control of other property stolen on a sepa-
rate occasion; or 
(b) Has received other, stolen pi opei ty i > ith in the year preceding the 
receiving offense charged; or 
(c) Being a dealer in property of the sort received, retained, or disposed, 
acquires it for a consideration which he knows is far below its reasonable 
value. 
(d) Is a pawnbroker or person who has or operates a business dealing in 
or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal property, or an 
agent, employee or representative of the pawnbroker or person who buys, 
receives or obtains property and fails to require the seller or person deliv-
ering the property to certify, in writing, that he has the legal rights to sell 
the property. If the value given for the property exceeds $20 the pawnbro-
ker or person shall also require the seller or person delivering the prop-
erty to obtain a legible print, preferably the right thumb, at the bottom of 
the certificate next to his signature and at least one other positive form of 
identification. 
(i) Every pawnbroker or person who has or operates a business 
dealing in or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal 
property, and every agent, employee or representative of the pawn-
broker or person who fails to comply with the requirements of (d) 
shall be presumed to have bought, received or obtained the property 
knowing it to have been stolen or unlawfully obtained. This presump-
tion may be rebutted by proof. 
(ii) When in a prosecution under this section it appears from the 
evidence that the defendant was a pawnbroker or a person who has or 
operates a business dealing in or collecting used or secondhand mer-
chandise or personal property, or was an agent, employee, or repre-
sentative of a pawnbroker or person, that the defendant bought, re-
ceived, concealed or withheld the property without requiring the per-
son from whom he bought, received, or obtained the property to sign 
the certificate required in paragraph (d) and in the event the transac-
tion involves an amount exceeding $20 also place his legible print, 
preferably the right thumb, on the certificate, then the burden shall 
be upon the defendant to show that the property bought, received or 
obtained was not stolen. 
(3) As used in this section: 
(a) "Receives" means acquiring possession, control, or title or lending 
on the security of the property; 
(b) "Dealer" means a person in the business of buying or selling goods. 
76-6-412. Theft — Classification of offenses — Action foi 
treble damages against receiver of stolen prop 
erty. 
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this chapter shall be pun-
ishable: 
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the: 
(i) value of the property or services exceeds $1,000; 
(ii) property stolen is a firearm or an operable motor vehicle; 
(iii) actor is armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the theft; 
or 
(iv) property is stolen from the person of another, 
(b) as a felony of the third degree if the: 
(i) value of the property or services is more than $250 but not more 
than $1,000; 
(ii) actor has been twice before convicted of theft, any robbery, or 
any burglary with intent to commit theft; or 
(iii) property taken is a stallion, mare, colt, gelding, cow, heifer, 
steer, ox, bull, calf, sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny, swine, or poultry; 
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen was 
more than $100 but does not exceed $250; or 
(d) as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen was 
$100 or less. 
(2) Any person who has been injured by a violation of Subsection 
76-6-408(1) may bring an action against any person mentioned in Subsection 
76-6-408(2)(d) for three times the amount of actual damages, if any sustained 
by the plaintiff, costs of suit and reasonable attorneys' fees. 
77-1-4. Conviction to precede punishment. 
No person shall be punished for a public offense until convicted in a court 
having jurisdiction. 
78-24-9. Duty to answer questions — Privilege. 
A witness must answer questions legal and pertinent to the matter in issue 
although his answer may establish a claim against himself; but he need not 
give an answer which will have a tendency to subject him to punishment for a 
ielony; nor need he give an answer which will have a direct tendency to 
degrade his character, unless itjsjto the very fact in issue or to a fact from 
St^lfSJ11 ***?* W 0 U l d ?* P ^ 1 ™ ^ But a witness must answer the fact of his previous conviction of felony. answer as to 
U.S. Const, amend VI states: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State 
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed; which 
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of 
counsel for his defence. 
Utah Const, art T, *5 12 states: 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear 
and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of 
the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own 
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compul-
sory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, 
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or dis-
trict in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the 
right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, 
before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure 
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to 
give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify 
against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person 
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
ttbepjfo -*• UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE Rule 609 
Rule 609. Impeachment by evidence of conviction of 
crime, 
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, 
evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited 
from him or established by public record during cross-examination but only if 
the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year 
under the law under which he was convicted, and the court determines that 
the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect 
to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of 
the punishment. 
